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INTRODUCTION

In CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp.,' a
divided Alaska Supreme Court held that whenever an insurance
company reserves its right to disclaim coverage, the insured has the
unilateral right to select independent counsel.2 This selection, the
court concluded, is limited only by the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, which requires that the insured select an
attorney who is reasonably competent, based on his experience and
training, to conduct the defense.3
The CHI decision arose in the context of a dispute in insurance defense litigation. The plaintiff's complaint stated claims
against an insured defendant. Some of these claims would have
been covered by the defendant's insurance, while others would
have been excluded under the listed exclusions of the insurance
policy.4 Determining that an insurance company's reservation of
rights entitles the insured to independent counsel for all alleged
claims, the Alaska Supreme Court rejected an approach that would
have allowed the insurer-appointed counsel5 to continue to represent the insured alongside independent counsel.6 Under this "dualcounsel" scheme, independent counsel would have defended the
insured at the expense of the insurance company against claims that
would be excluded under the policy, while appointed counsel would
have remained involved in the defense of the covered claims.' In
CHI, the defendant, Employers Reinsurance, advocated the dualcounsel scheme both in the trial court and on appeal.' Justice
Compton, in his dissent, also argued for such an approach.'
The court also rejected an alternate method that would have
permitted the insurance company to retain the right of reasonable

1. 844 P.2d 1113 (Alaska 1993) (three justice majority, with one justice
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and one justice dissenting).
2. Id. at 1121.
3. Id.

4. See id. at 1115.
5. Throughout this article, the terminology of the CHI opinion will be
utilized. Thus, the term "appointed counsel" shall refer to the lawyer selected by

the insurer to defend its insured. The term "independent counsel" shall refer to
a lawyer selected by the insured, unless context indicates otherwise. The choice of
terminology, however, should not suggest that appointed counsel cannot be
independent of the insurer's influence.

6.
7.
8.
9.

CHI, 844 P.2d at 1130 (Compton, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1119-20.
Id. at 1115, 1119-20.
Id. at 1129-31 (Compton, J., dissenting).

1994]

CHI

approval of the lawyer selected by the insured. ° Although this
position was not advocated by the parties on appeal, Justice Moore,
in a partially concurring and partially dissenting opinion, argued for
this right."
The CHI decision postdates by nearly a decade the landmark
California Court of Appeal decision in San Diego Navy Federal
In Cumis, the
Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc.
court held that an insurer's defense of a lawsuit under a "reservation of fights" creates a conflict of interest between the insurer
and its insured. Because of this conflict, the insurer is obligated to
pay for independent counsel of the insured's choice, 3 who is then
authorized to control the defense of the lawsuit. 4
The actual holding of the Cumis case, however, did not go so
far as the holding in CHI. In Cumis, for example, the appointed
counsel remained involved with the defense of the insured, 5 a
result rejected in CHI.6 Decisions subsequent to Cumis have also
narrowed the breadth of its holding. In McGee v. Superior
Court,7 for example, the California Court of Appeal held that a
right to independent counsel arises only when a coverage dispute
turns upon issues that the defense counsel has the power to control
at trial." The Alaska Supreme Court failed to articulate such a
limitation in CHI.
The Cumis decision has spawned considerable confusion for
attorneys involved in insurance-related litigation. The opinion has
also led to abuses by both insurers and attorneys selected by
insured parties. Moreover, the holding has had an adverse
economic impact on the public in California.' Although holdings
of Alaska courts on matters of state law seldom, if ever, have an

10. Id. at 1120-21.
11. Id. at 1122 (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 496.
Id. at 501, 506.
Id. at 497, 506.
16. CGH of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1118
(Alaska 1993).
12.
13.
14.
15.

17. 221 Cal. Rptr. 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
18. Id. at 423.
19. Sampson A. Brown & John L. Romaker, Cumis, Conflicts and the Civil
Code: Section 2860 Changes Little, 25 CAL. W. L. REV. 45, 63-68 (1988). Section
2860 of the California Civil Code was a legislative response to the flood of
litigation spawned by the decision in Cumis. Id. at 68; see CAL. CIv. CODE § 2860

(West 1993); see also Mark A. Saxon, Conflicts of Interest Insurers' Expanding
Duty to Defend and the Impact of "Cumis" Counsel, 23 IDAHO L. REv. 351 (1987)
(analyzing the Cumis decision and its effects on insurance litigation).
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impact comparable to analogous decisions of the California
courts,2 the Alaska Supreme Court, with its recognition of a
unilateral right of the insured to select counsel and its rejection of
a two-counsel scheme,21 has even "out-Cumised" the Cumis
decision.
Given the extensive reaction to Cumis and similar decisions,
it is unfortunate that the Alaska Supreme Court has embarked on
the course selected in CHI. Most obviously, the court reached its
decision with little reference to the Alaska Code of Professional
Responsibility.' The Code defined every lawyer's obligation to
his client-in this case, the insured. Wholly disregarding the ethical
constraints imposed by the Code, the CHI court also made certain
assumptions about the propensities of appointed counsel to favor
the interests of the insurer over its insured. Implicitly embracing
the dual-client doctrine to provide logical support for its holding,'
the court assumed that a lawyer being paid by an insurance
company either cannot or will not distinguish between his client,
the insured and the insurer.
Seven months after CHI, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted
the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct to replace the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Rules require the lawyer, in every
instance in which he is being paid by a third person, to obtain the
consent of the client prior to accepting compensation for that
representation.24 The Rules also dictate that a lawyer must ensure
that no one interferes with his independent professional judgment' and that information relating to the representation of the
client must be protected from disclosure.26 Consideration of such
ethical rules should have provided the starting point for the court's
analysis.
This article suggests that the Alaska Supreme Court should
revisit the holding of CHI and restrict its application. As one
20. This would seem self-evident given that Alaska ranks 49th in population
amongst the states, while California ranks first. WORLD ALMANAC 1994 364
(1993) ("Population by State: 1990," according to the Bureau of the Census).
21. Beyond the scope of the CHI rule are other conflicts of interest that can
arise between insurer and insured, such as settlement demands at or in excess of
policy limits.
22. The Alaska Code of Professional Responsibility, based upon the ABA
Model Code, governed the conduct of lawyers in Alaska at the time of the CHI
decision. The CHI court cites it only once, in a context that will be the subject of
some criticism later in this article. See infra part IV.B.
23. See CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113,
1116-17 (Alaska 1993).
24. ALASKA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(0(1) (1993).

25. Id. Rule 1.8(0(2).
26. Id. Rule 1.8(0(3).
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option, the court could simply more narrowly construe the phrase
"right to independent counsel." Alternatively, the court could
declare that if appointed counsel obtains the client's consent,
appointed counsel can continue to represent that client despite the
insurer's reservation of rights, consistent with the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
Part II examines the way in which "CHI-type" issues arise,
provides a classification scheme for these issues that assists in the
analysis of the case and engages in a discussion of the Alaska case
law that pre-dated the CHI decision. Part III examines the factual
background and proceedings of the CHI case, as well as the
resolution of those proceedings and the court's rationale. Part IV
analyzes and critiques the principal bases for the recognition of a
right to independent counsel, in part by comparing the CHI
decision to Cumis and other decisions cited by the CHI court. As
an alternative to the CHI holding, Part V suggests a less radical
rule founded in the ethical requirements and guidelines that govern
the legal profession.
II. THE BACKGROUND TO CHI
A. The Duties of Insurers in Alaska
Liability insurance policies typically provide the insured with
two kinds of protection: (1) indemnity for amounts paid for covered
losses and (2) payment for the costs of defending claims made
against the insured.' The Alaska Supreme Court has long recognized that "an insurer's obligation to indemnify and its duty to
defend are separate and distinct contractual elements."' Liability
policies obligate the insurer to defend all actions against the
insured that might arguably fall within the coverage of the policy,
even though the allegations may ultimately be shown to be
groundless, false or fraudulent.29 Therefore, cases may arise in
27. "It is generally accepted that one of the most important benefits of an

insurance policy is the insurer's duty to defend the insured. This is particularly
true today as the expense of litigation continues to rise to prohibitive levels for
individuals as well as large corporations." Saxon, supra note 19, at 351. In a
sense, the insurer sells attorneys' services in advance to those who purchase

liability policies.
28. Sauer v. Home Indem. Co., 841 P.2d 176, 180 (Alaska 1992).

29. Afcan v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 595 P.2d 638, 645 (Alaska
1979).
Although the precise language varies, the typical defense clause states:
With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy, the company

shall have the right and the duty to defend any suit against the insured
alleging such act or omission and seeking damages which are payable
under the terms of this policy, even if any of the allegations of the suit
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which the insurer will be obligated to defend an insured even
though it will have no eventual obligation to pay the judgment."
The presence of allegations in the complaint that are not
within policy coverage, however, does not necessarily relieve the
insurer of its duty to defend. If the complaint also contains claims
that fall within the policy's coverage, then the insurer must defend
the insured against both types of claims.3 This duty to defend
mixed claims may also extend to a suit that alleges facts within an
exception to the policy; if the "true facts" are potentially or actually
within the policy coverage and are known or reasonably ascertainable by the insurer, then the insurer must provide a defense.32
Thus, the insurer's duty to defend arises in three distinct situations:
(1) where the complaint states a claim within the policy and with
supporting facts; (2) where the complaint states a claim within the
policy, but the facts may indicate there is no coverage; and (3)
where the complaint states a claim outside the policy, but the
operative facts indicate the claim is actually covered.33
Legal options are fairly clear under Alaska law when an
insurer has doubts regarding its duty to defend, the scope of
coverage or whether or not coverage is available to its insured. The
Alaska Supreme Court outlined these alternatives in a case decided
two months prior to CHI.' The coverage issue, unless it relates
to the conduct of the insured person, is created by the allegations
of the claimant. The liberal rules of pleading permit the claimant
to allege a variety of legal theories that "[o]ften ...bear little

relationship to reality., 35 An insurer, however, is required to give

are groundless, false, or fraudulent. The Company may investigate and
settle any claim or suit that it considers proper.
Saxon, supra note 19, at 352 n.4..
The contract in CHI provided that:
[Employers], in Insured's name and behalf, shall have the right to
investigate, defend and conduct settlement negotiations in any claim or
suit. The Insured shall not admit liability for, or make any voluntary
settlement, or incur any costs or expenses in connection with any claim
involving payment by [Employers], except with the written consent of
[Employers].
CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1122 n.4
(Alaska 1993).
30. Afcan, 595 P.2d at 645.
31. Sauer, 841 P.2d at 181.
32. Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Collins, 794 P.2d 936, 945 (Alaska 1990)
(citations omitted).
33. Afcan, 595 P.2d at 646.
34. See Sauer, 841 P.2d at 182-84.
35. CHIT of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1129
(Alaska 1993) (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting RONALD
E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACtiCE § 23.16 (3d ed. 1989)).
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the insured prompt notice of any intention to deny liability or any
refusal to defend.3 6 The notice must also "provide a reasonable
explanation of the basis in the insurance policy in relation to the
facts or applicable law for denial of a claim."'37
The insurer who questions its duty to defend or the scope of
coverage may do so for a variety of reasons. The Alaska Supreme
Court has not categorized or catalogued these reasons in any of the
cases regarding conflicts of interest. The CHI rule, however,
presumably applies whenever such an issue arises. The insurer's
decision to deny defense of the insured or its refusal to fulfill its
indemnity obligations to an insured forms the basis for the conflict
of interest that triggers the CHI rule. Thus, whenever an insurer
reserves its right to question its obligations under the insurance
policy, the rule in CHI instructs that the insured has the right to
select independent counsel of its choice.
B. Types of Conflicts over Coverage
The Alaska Supreme Court has established a distinction
between policy defenses and coverage defenses.38 Under a policy
defense, the insurer claims that some condition of an otherwise
applicable policy has been breached by the insured. A typical
example is the insured's failure to give timely notice of a claim or
to cooperate with the insurance company in conducting the
defense.3 9 If the insurance company continues to provide a
defense to the insured, it can avoid paying the underlying claim
either by conducting a successful defense of the insured or by
successfully asserting a policy defense following a finding of liability
on the part of the insured.'
Coverage defenses arise when an insurer admits the validity of
the policy but contends that it does not extend to a particular
claim. According to the CHI court, the most typical example of a
coverage defense involves a situation where alternative theories of
negligent and intentional tort are pled, and the policy covers
negligent, but not intentional, torts.4 Employers asserted this

36. Sauer, 841 P.2d at 182.
37. ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.125 (1993).

38. Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281, 288-89
(Alaska 1980).
39. See CHI, 844 P.2d at 1115.

40. Id.
41. Id. Although the basis for such an exclusion of coverage is sometimes
embodied in a statute, see, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1993) ("An insurer
is not liable for a loss caused by the willful act of the insured.. . ."), the principal
reason for the exclusion of intentional or willful acts is based upon the rationale
that insurance is generally designed to provide protection against random or
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type of coverage defense in CHL42
Another category of issues regarding coverage deals with the
type or extent of damages.43 An insurance policy, for example,
may not cover claims for punitive damages or those related to
certain types of hazards." Furthermore, bodily injuries may not
be covered in a professional liability policy, as general liability
insurance would ordinarily be relied upon to provide this type of
protection.45 The extent of damages may also be an issue if the
claim exceeds the policy limits.'
Another common source of disputes centers on the issue of
whether a certain person qualifies as an insured.47 The resolution
of these issues may require a determination of both legal issues
centering on the language of the policy, as well as factual issues
pertaining to the relationship of the claimant with one who is
clearly covered under the policy.'
C. Insurer Options Under Alaska Law When It Has Doubts
About Its Coverage
The Alaska Supreme Court recently set out, in Sauer v. Home
Indemnity Co.,49 the options available to an insurance company

when it has doubts about its coverage. First, the insurer may
provide an unconditional defense, ordinarily causing the doctrines
of waiver and estoppel to bar the insurance company from later
contesting coverage.5" Second, if the insurance company can
negotiate a non-waiver agreement with its insured, it may conduct
the defense conditionally.5' The insurer also can accomplish this
by sending a reservation of rights letter and receiving insured's

unforeseen events. Ronald E. Mallen, A New Definition of Insurance Defense

Counsel, 53 INs. COUNS. J. 108, 112 (1986). The traditional definition of risk as
something "neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured,"
leads to the inclusion of coverage clauses requiring an "occurrence" or "accident"
before coverage is activated. Id. Intended injuries generally do not fall within the
traditional concept of risk because the insured would be consciously subjecting the
insurer to a loss. Id.
42. CHI, 844 P.2d at 1114.
43. Mallen, supra note 41, at 113.

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

48. Id.

49. Sauer v. Home Indem. Co., 841 P.2d 176, 183 (Alaska 1992).
50. Id. at 182 (citing 7C JoHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND
PRACrICE § 4692 (rev. vol. 1979)).
51. Id.
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consent to a conditional defense. 2 Providing a conditional
defense under a reservation of rights allows the insurance company
to retain its option to later disclaim coverage after a judgment has
been entered. 3 The insured may, however, refuse to consent
either to a non-waiver agreement or to a defense under a reservation of rights. The insurance company is then forced either to
conduct an unconditional defense or pursue other courses of
action.54
Under one such course of action, the insurer simply may refuse
to defend. If the case involves a policy defense, the insurance
company thus preserves its right to litigate the policy coverage
question. 6 When the case involves a coverage defense, however,
the consequences of the insurer's withdrawal make the situation
more complex. According to the Sauer court, the complexity arises
from the distinct contractual duty to defend whenever there is a
cause of action even potentially within policy coverage, though the
company may have no ultimate liability under the policy. A
conundrum is created by conflicting decisions arising in this
setting. 7
The second course of action available to the insurance
company recounts the issue presented in CHI. As expressed by the
Sauer court, the insurer may "permit the insured to exercise its
right to reject the defense offered by the insurer and to obtain
substitute counsel at the insurer's expense. '58 If the defense is
handled by substitute counsel, the insurance company clearly
preserves its right to challenge policy coverage in a subsequent
proceeding 9

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 182-83.
Id. at 183.
Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281, 291 (Alaska

1980).
57. Compare Theodore v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co., 364 P.2d 51,
55 (Alaska 1961) (holding that where there is a refusal to defend, insurer is liable
for full amount of settlement reached by insured, without right to claim liability
is not covered by policy in subsequent litigation) with Afcan v. Mutual Fire,
Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 595 P.2d 638, 647 (Alaska 1979) (holding that when
settlement is reached in suit which alleged several grounds for relief and
settlement is not necessarily within coverage of policy, insurer that has wrongfully
refused to defend may bring subsequent action on the policy to show that loss is
not within coverage of policy).
58. Sauer, 841 P.2d at 183.
59. Id. (citing Bayless & Roberts, 608 P.2d at 291 n.17).
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D. Pre-CHIDecisions on the Issue of Independent Counsel
In three previous decisions, the Alaska Supreme Court had
alluded to the insured's right to independent counsel. In National
Indemnity Co. v. Flesher,° the court considered an insurer's
assertion of a coverage defense and merely noted, in dictum, that
"[i]n such circumstances, the insurer must provide the insured with
independent counsel."'"
Ten years later, in Continental Insurance Co. v. Bayless &
Roberts, Inc.,6" the court held that when a policy defense is
asserted, "the insured is fully within its rights and does not breach
the policy's cooperation clause when it insists that an insurer either
defend unconditionally or withdraw from the defense of the
insured."" The court also noted that:
The possibility of a conflict might be avoided in such cases if the
insurance company were to offer its insured the right to retain
independent counsel to conduct his defense, and agree to pay all
the necessary costs of that defense. In that event, it would seem
that the company should be entitled to reserve the right to later
litigate and allege a policy defense.'
Most recently, in Criterion Insurance Co. v. Velthouse, 5 the
court noted "potential problems" where the insurer had appointed
counsel for its insured and reserved the right to contest coverage.66 The court expressed no opinion on the insured's right to
select independent counsel at that time, however, leaving the issue
to arise again in CHI. 7
III. THE CHI CASE

In the following sections, the facts and proceedings leading up
to the decision in CHI are described. By way of comparison, the
parallel developments in Cumis are noted.

60. 469 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1970).
61. Id. at 367 n.22.
62. 608 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1980).
63. Id. at 291.
64. Id. at 291 n.17.
65. 751 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1986).
66. Id. at 2 n.2 (citing San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y,
208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 506 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).
67. Id.
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The Facts of CHI

The dispute in CHI arose when a seaman on board a ship
owned by Oceanic Research Services, Inc., was accidentally
injured." Oceanic carried an insurance policy, issued through
CHI of Alaska, Inc., with a bodily injury limit of $100,000.69
Oceanic believed, however, that it was insured against such losses
for up to $500,000.7° To resolve this coverage dispute, Oceanic
sued CHI, seeking both compensatory and punitive damages.'
Oceanic asserted contract and negligence claims and a claim that
CHI had intentionally misrepresented that the policy coverage was
$5 00 ,00 0 .'f CHI tendered the defense of the suit to its liability
insurer, Employers Reinsurance Corporation.73 Employers offered
to provide CHI with a conditional defense, stating that it would
reserve its right to disclaim coverage with respect to Oceanic's
cause of action for intentional misconduct 4 Employers elected
to choose counsel to represent CHIL In informing CHI of this
decision, Employers also advised CHI to consider retaining
separate counsel for the claims allegedly excluded under the
policy.76 Through this offer, Employers proposed the two-counsel

68. CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1114

(Alaska 1993).
69. Id.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
Union

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. By way of comparison, the Cumis case, San Diego Navy Federal Credit
v. Cumis Insurance Society, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), arose

in May 1981 when the San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union and several of its
officers were named as defendants in a lawsuit filed by a former employee. Id. at
496. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages for a tortious
wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and other related claims. Id. The credit
union tendered the defense of the lawsuit to its insurance carrier, Cumis Insurance
Society, Inc. Id. In response to the tender of defense, Cumis sent a reservation
of rights letter to the credit union which stated that Cumis had retained defense
counsel for the credit union but that Cumis was reserving its right to disclaim

coverage at a future date. The letter specifically denied coverage for punitive
damages. Id.
75. Brief for Appellant at 5, CHI (No. S-4323).
76. Id. In Cumis, upon receipt of the reservation of rights letter, the credit
union became concerned about its insurance coverage and the potential exposure
from the employee's lawsuit. Cumis, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 497. The credit union

retained its own attorneys to protect its interests. Id. That firm became
co-counsel of record with the appointed counsel that Cumis had retained to
provide the defense. Id. Independent counsel presented a claim to Cumis seeking
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scheme discussed earlier.'
"Employers' original choice of counsel withdrew from the case
after a dispute arose as to whether that firm was attempting to
represent both CHI and Employers at the same time."78 Employers then notified CHI that it would void the insurance policy for
non-cooperation if CFI refused to agree to Employers' choice of
counsel."
CHI insisted that Employers pay for independent
counsel unilaterally selected by CHIO ° Employers was dissatisfied
with the attorney CHI wished to retain due to the attorney's lack
of experience in handling the type of claims being litigated. When
Employers suggested that CHI furnish a list of other more experienced attorneys who might be retained by Employers to defend
CHI, CHI refused to agree.81 Employers further suggested it
would pay the lawyer selected by CHI to defend the intentional
misconduct claim, while, at the same time, selecting an "independent" law firm to act as co-counsel to CHI's attorney on the
defense of all claims.' CHI also declined this offer.'
B.

CHI: In the Trial Court
CHI filed suit for declaratory relief, seeking allowance to
retain its own choice of counsel in the Oceanic case." Both

payment of attorneys' fees in the litigation. Id. Cumis agreed with the demand
and began paying the attorneys' fees incurred by the credit union for independent
counsel. Id.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
78. Brief for Appellant at 5, CHI (No. S-4323). In Cumis, while the lawsuit

was proceeding and Cumis was paying both the defense counsel it had retained
and the credit union's independent counsel, Cumis asked appointed counsel for an
opinion as to whether there was a conflict of interest which might require Cumis
to pay for the independent counsel fees of the credit union. Saxon, supra note 19,
at 356. The appointed counsel advised Cumis that they found no such conflict of
interest. Id. Cumis then informed the independent counsel of the credit union
that they did not believe there was a sufficient conflict of interest to justify Cumis
continuing to pay for the independent counsel. Id. Cumis further indicated that
the credit union would have to defend itself on the punitive damages claim
because it was excluded from coverage under the Cumis policies and by California

law. Id.
79. Brief for Appellant at 5, CHI (No. S-4323).
80. CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1114
(Alaska 1993).
81. Id.
82. This law firm was "independent" of Employers in that it had not previously
represented that company. Brief for Appellee at 4-5, CHI (No. S-4323).
83. CHI, 844 P.2d at 1114.
84. Id.
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parties moved for summary judgment.8 "CHI contended that
there was necessarily a conflict of interest between CHI and
Employers respecting the defense of Oceanic's claim because
Employers could either win by defeating all claims of liability or by
establishingthat CHI was liable for intentionalmisconduct."6 CHI
demanded that Employers be precluded from participating in the
selection of defense counsel, arguing that, as a result of the conflict
of interest, any attorney selected by an insurance company "will
attempt to help his real client, the insurance company, at the
expense of the insured."' In opposition to CHI's motion and in
support of its own motion for summary judgment, "Employers
argued the potential conflicts were eliminated by allowing CHI to
have its personal attorney handle the non-covered claim at
Employers' expense. '
The superior court granted Employers' motion for summary
judgment, holding that Employers' offer to allow CIH to retain its
choice of counsel to defend it on the intentional tort claim
adequately resolved potential conflicts of interest.8 9 CHI appealed this decision."
C. The Appeal
1. The Arguments of the Parties. The issues presented for
review in Cm's brief included: (1) whether a reservation of rights
by an insurer triggers a right to independent counsel for the
insured; (2) whether the selection of independent counsel was
prohibited by the insurance contract and (3) whether any require-

85. Id.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id. In Cumis, the credit union filed a declaratory relief action against
Cumis before the underlying lawsuit was tried. Saxon, supra note 19, at 357. The
credit union "requested that the trial court declare that Cumis was required by law
and contract to pay for the fees of its independent counsel." Id. The trial court
found in favor of the credit union and held that Cumis was required to pay for
independent counsel. San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, 208
Cal. Rptr. 494, 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). The trial court found that the actions of
the defense attorney in the third party case have an impact on the issue of
coverage, since questions of coverage depend on the development of facts in that
case. Id. The trial court judge expressed a concern that appointed counsel "would
be tempted to develop the facts to help his real client, the Carrier company, as
opposed to the insured for whom he will never likely work again." Id. The trial
court opinion was clearly influenced by the fact that appointed counsel had
advised Cumis while representing the insured. Id. at 499.
88. CHI, 844 P.2d at 1115.

89. Id
90. Id.
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ment of independent counsel is satisfied "by allowing independent
counsel to defend only those claims arising outside the scope of the
insurance policy coverage.91 In its brief, Employers argued that
the court could eliminate any potential conflicts of interest by
simply refusing to apply the judgment by estoppel rule' in any
subsequent litigation between insurer and insured. 3 Alternatively,
Employers asserted that it was entitled to set certain qualifications
for independent counsel,94 that the appointment of independent
counsel would not reduce the amount of litigation, 95 and that "the
claims for which reservations of rights were made [were] such a
minor part of the underlying case that extraordinary relief such as
that requested was not warranted." 96 The most detailed section
of Employers' brief was devoted to an argument in favor of the
dual-counsel scheme.'
2. The Alaska Supreme CourtDecision. The Alaska Supreme
Court defined three issues in the appeal:
1. Did Employers' reservation of rights to disclaim coverage
give CHI a right to retain independent counsel?
91. Brief for Appellant at 3, CHI (No. S-4323).
92. The effects of abrogating the judgment by estoppel rule are discussed at
infra text accompanying notes 157-160. In essence, "not using the judgment by
estoppel rule" in this context means that the findings of facts in the underlying
action are not binding in a subsequent coverage action.
93. Brief for Appellee at 8, CHI (No. S-4323).
94. Id. at 12.
95. Id. at 21.
96. Id. at 22.
97. Id. at 17-24. Comparison of the briefing in CHI with that in Cumis reveals
an interesting contrast between the little attention given to this issue in Alaska as
opposed to California. CHI's brief contained 31 pages, Brief for Appellant, CHI
(No. S-4323); Employers's 25 pages, Brief for Appellee, CHI (No. S-4323); and
CHI's reply 13 pages, Appellant's Reply Brief, CHI (No. S-4323). By contrast, in
response to the trial court opinion in Cumis, the following organizations filed amici
curiae briefs with the California Court of Appeal: Association of Defense
Counsel, Association of Southern Defense Counsel, American Insurance
Association, Association of California Insurance Companies, National Association
of Independent Insurers, and California Land Title Association. Saxon, supra note
19, at 358 n.28. This phenomenon provides support for the observation regarding
the relative impact of Alaska and California decisions. See supra note 20 and
accompanying text. Although the holding in CHI could have significant
ramifications for insurance defense practice in Alaska, the appeal received little
attention. The briefing on both sides also failed to address the question of
whether the ethical framework set out in the Alaska Code of Professional
Responsibility provided adequate safeguards in a potential conflict of interest
situation if truly independent counsel was appointed by an insurer to defend the
insured.
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2. Does the two-counsel scheme proposed by Employers and
approved by the superior court satisfy CHI's right to independent counsel?
3. Does
9 8 CHI have the unilateral right to select independent
counsel?

The following sections review and critique the majority's
disposition of these issues. The sections also analyze (1) Justice
Compton's dissenting opinion in favor of a dual-counsel scheme
and (2) Justice Moore's separate concurring and dissenting opinion,
which would give the insurer the right to approve the insured's
choice of counsel.
a. An Insurer's Reservation of Rights to Disclaim Coverage
Gives an Insured a Right to Retain Independent Counsel. First and
most importantly, the CHI court held that Employers' reservation
of the right to disclaim coverage gave CHI a right to retain
independent counsel." In reaching this conclusion, the court
reviewed some of the basic principles governing the insurer's duty
to defend' and then considered situations in which the insurer
might seek to avoid paying the underlying claim.''
In reaching its decision, the CHI court analyzed the three basic
types of conflicts of interest that can arise between the insurer and
the insured when the insurer issues a reservation of rights letter.
First, the insurer may only "go through the motions" of defending
the insured when the insurer knows (1) it can later assert a noncoverage defense or (2) thinks the loss which it is defending will
not be covered."° Second, when there are different theories of
recoverability, the insurer might be prone to conduct the defense
in such a manner that the plaintiff would be more likely to obtain
a verdict based on a theory that would deny coverage.'03 Third,
in defending the insured, the insurer might discover confidential or
privileged information that it could later use to its advantage in
litigation concerning coverage.' °4 The CHI court reasoned that
because policy defenses rarely involve facts of significance in the

98. CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1115
(Alaska 1993).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1115-16.
102. Id. at 1116 (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d
281, 289 (Alaska 1980)).
103. Id. Interestingly, the CHI court conceded that this argument really does
not apply in the setting of a "policy defense," such as that presented in Bayless &
Roberts, 608 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1980), the case in which the court listed the conflicts
for the first time. CHI, 844 P.2d at 1118.
104. Id. at 1116 (citing Bayless & Roberts, 608 P.2d at 291).
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underlying litigation, 5 situations are unlikely to arise in which an
attorney will conduct the insured's defense with the goal of
obtaining a verdict that will allow the insurance company to later

assert a successful policy defense." Such a conflict could arise,
however, in cases involving a coverage dispute. The court
concluded, therefore, that the "need for independent counsel is, if
anything, greater in coverage than in policy defense cases"" and
extended the right to independent counsel to cases involving
coverage disputes. 8
The Alaska Supreme Court, in support of its conclusion that
Employers' reservation of the right to disclaim coverage gave CHI
a right to retain independent counsel,"° also observed that most

courts have held that in conflict of interest situations, the insured
has the right to have independent counsel conduct its defense."'
Moreover, the right to independent counsel in cases involving a
coverage defense had been alluded to previously in dictum."' To

105. Id. at 1118.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Michael A. Berch & Rebecca W. Berch, Will the Real Counsel
for the Insured Please Rise?, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 27, 38 (1987)).
108. Id. at 1118-19 (citing Sauer v. Home Indem. Co., 841 P.2d 176, 182-83
(Alaska 1992)). The right to independent counsel in cases involving a policy
defense was established in Continental Insurance Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc.,
608 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1980). The Bayless court declined to address the question
of whether the same right existed in coverage defense cases. CHI, 844 P.2d at
1118-19.
109. Id. at 1115.
110. Id. at 1120 (citations omitted). Justice Moore, however, correctly observes
in his vigorous separate opinion that:
Although the court purports to align itself with what it considers to be
the "majority view" an analysis of the cases it relies on reveals that most
courts which have recognized the insured's "right to independent
counsel" have not explicitly analyzed the scope of this right or fully
considered its impact on the rights of the insurer.
Id.at 1123 (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
For purposes of this discussion, it is conceded that the prevailing view in other
jurisdictions is that the presence of the coverage issue enables the insured to reject
appointed counsel and select his own lawyer at the expense of the insurer. By
contrast, the minority view relies upon the integrity of defense counsel to ensure
thaf coverage issues do not interfere with the quality of the defense provided to
the insured. Siebert Oxidermo, Inc. v. Shields, 430 N.E.2d 401, 403 (Ind.Ct. App.
1982), affd, 446 N.E.2d 332 (Ind.1983); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trainor, 294
N.E.2d 874,878 (Ohio 1973); Norman v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 239 S.E.2d 902,
907-08 (Va. 1978).
111. CHI,844 P.2d at 1118 (citing National Indem. Co. v. Flesher, 469 P.2d 360,
367 n.22 (Alaska 1977)).
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further bolster its conclusion, the court cited two cases 112 and four
law review articles"' to support its proposition that "appointed
counsel may tend to favor the interests of the insurer primarily
because of the prospect of future employment., 4 The court
suggested that:
Merely because the insurer and the insured have divergent
interests when the insurer seeks to defend under a reservation of
rights does not necessarily mean that appointed counsel also has
conflicting interests. If appointed counsel makes it clear at the
outset of his engagement that he is going to be involved only in
the defense of the liability claim, not in coverage issues, and that
his client
is the insured, not the insurer, conflicts should be
115
rare.
Similarly, the California Court of Appeal in Cumis had also
analyzed the types of conflicts that could arise between insurer and
insured." 6 Unlike the situation in CHI, however, the lawyer
appointed to represent the insured in Cumis also rendered coverage
advice on the same matter to the insurer."7 This created a
situation in which counsel was giving advice to the insurer contrary
to his client's interests. This conflict provided the crucial underpinning for the Cumis court's determination that every time such a
situation arises "the lawyer is placed in the dilemma of helping one
of his clients concerning insurance coverage and harming the other.
No matter how honest the intentions, counsel cannot discharge
inconsistent duties."" 8 By contrast, the counsel appointed by
Employers to defend CHI had never represented Employers in
court" 9 Thus, despite the lack of any evidence in CHI that an
actual conflict of interest had developed-as compared to the facts
in Cumis-the court premised the balance of its discussion and
resolution of the potential conflict of interest issue'20 on the view

112. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lewis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932,
938 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978); San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y,
208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
113. Berch & Berch, supra note 107, at 29-30; Arthur P. Berg, Losing Control
of the Defense-The Insured's Right to Select His Own Counsel, FOR THE DEF.,
July 1984, at 10, 15; Brown & Romaker, supra note 19, at 54; Saxon, supra note
19, at 353.
114. CHI, 844 P.2d at 1117.
115. Id. at 1116 (citation omitted).
116. Cumis, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
117. Id. at 497.
118. Id. at 499.
119. Brief for Appellee at 4-5, CHI (No. S-4342).
120. CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113,111618 (Alaska 1993).
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that "appointed counsel represents both the insured and the
insurer. , 121

b. The Two-Counsel Scheme Does Not Satisfy an Insured's
Right to Independent Counsel Under the CHI Decision. The trial
court had determined that neither CHI nor Employers would be
bound by any findings of fact in the underlying suit concerning the
nature of the conduct of CIHI.'" As a result, the trial court
concluded that the two-counsel plan proposed by Employers would
resolve the conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured.' 3 The supreme court agreed that "issues determined in
the initial action as to which a conflict of interest exists between the
insurer and insured may be subsequently relitigated."'' l
The
access of appointed counsel to information possessed by the
insured, however, concerned the court, as it potentially could be
used against the insured in subsequent proceedings regarding
coverage."z The court also posited that "the opportunity to
direct a case through witness selection, interrogation, and discovery
may afford a dispositive advantage in subsequent litigation,"'' 6
primarily because the testimony of the witness would be made
under oath in the initial litigation, leaving little opportunity in later
proceedings to "mold" the evidence regarding coverage.
Thus,
based on these concerns, the court concluded that the two-counsel
scheme does not satisfy the right of an insured to retain independent counsel.12
Both Justice Moore and Justice Compton, however, were
disturbed by the complete negation of the insurer's ability to
participate in the litigation. Justice Moore, in his concurring and

121. Id. at 1116.
122. Id. at 1119.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Berch & Berch, supra note 107, at 32 n.23). The Cumis court
also recognized that this ethical dilemma could arise during pretrial discovery,
when defense counsel investigates all possible theories of liability. San Diego
Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494,499 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984). Such investigations and client communications, according to the Cumis
court, often produce facts directly relating to the issue of coverage and may lead
to the formation of an opinion by the defense counsel regarding the credibility of
the insured. Id. Noting that "confidentiality is essential where communications
can affect coverage," the California Court of Appeal found that insurance defense
counsel is "forced to walk an ethical tightrope, and not communicate relevant
information which is beneficial to one or the other of his clients." Id.
126. CHI, 844 P.2d at 1119.
127. Id. at 1119-20.
128. Id. at 1120.
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dissenting opinion, observed that two of the cases relied upon by
the majority in recognizing the right of the insured to select
independent counsel also implicitly support the right of an insurer
to participate in the defense of its insured.'29 In Cumis, the
insurer was required to pay the fees of an attorney retained by the
insured to act as co-counsel with the insurer-selected attorney.Y°
Similarly, in American Family Life Assurance Co. v. United States
Fire Co.,"' the Eleventh Circuit affirmed an award of attorneys'
fees to an insured who had hired co-counsel to "monitor and aid in
the defense" provided by the insurer. In his separate dissenting
opinion, Justice Compton instead advocated the two-counsel
Under such an approach, the insurer would pay the
scheme.'
fees of the insured-selected independent counsel, but only to the
extent of defenses for claims that the insurer asserted fell outside
of policy coverage.134

The two-counsel scheme, however, also presents practical
problems regarding discovery and trial strategy. As noted by the
CHI court, a respected commentator has stated that "'[t]he role of
a second lawyer with clearly antagonistic coverage interests to the
insured is uncertain and seems inappropriate."" 35 For this
reason, this article does not recommend the two-counsel approach
advocated by Employers in the appeal and by Justice Compton in
his dissent.
c. An Insured Has the UnilateralRight to Select Independent
Counsel Subject to the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing. The CHI majority found that most courts that recognize
the right to independent counsel also extend this thinking one step
further: the opinions additionally support the proposition that the
insured has the right to select independent counsel of its choiceY
129. Id. at 1123 (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing
American Family Life Assur. Co. v. United States Fire Co., 885 F.2d 826 (11th Cir.
1989); San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr.
494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).

130. Cumis, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
131. 885 F.2d 826 (11th Cir. 1989).
132. Id. at 132. Similarly, "other cases cited in support of the majority view do
not hold that an insured has the unilateral right to select defense counsel to the

exclusion of any right of the insurer to participate in the defense." CHI, 844 P.2d
at 1123 n.6 (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
133. Id. at 1130-31 (Compton, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1130 (Compton, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1120 n.13 (quoting Mallen, supra note 41, at 119). The numerous
problems associated with the two-counsel scheme are outside the scope of this
article.
136. Id. at 1120 (citations omitted).
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Guided by a recent California case, 137 the CHI court found that
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every
insurance contract 38 requires the insured to "select an attorney
who is, by experience and training, reasonably thought to be
competent to conduct the defense of the insured."' 39 The court
asserted that the implied covenant would provide a "measure of
protection for insurers against overbilling and overlitigating by
independent counsel.""'
Unfortunately, the court failed to
specify by whose standards the competency of replacement counsel
should be measured. 4
Consequently, it was not surprising that the court found the
record unclear as to whether or not the lawyer selected by CHI to
serve as its independent counsel was a reasonable selection. 42
Accordingly the court remanded the case for a hearing to
determine whether that selection was reasonable. 4 1 If the trial
court found the choice unreasonable, it was directed to order CHI
to select qualified counsel.'"
IV. THE MERE RESERVATION OF RIGHTS TO DISCLAIM
COVERAGE SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY GIVE AN INSURED A
RIGHT TO RETAIN INDEPENDENT COUNSEL

In announcing the sweeping rule that confers upon the insured
the unilateral right to select independent counsel, the Alaska
Supreme Court did not adequately consider the actual degree of
impact that appointed counsel could have upon the outcome of the
litigation. Analysis of that effect suggests that a mere reservation
of rights to disclaim coverage should not necessarily give an insured
a right to retain independent counsel. The CHI court based its
holding, in large part, upon serious doubts about the ethical
character of appointed counsel. Because insurer-appointed counsel

137. Center Found. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 278 Cal. Rptr. 13, 21 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires
that the insured act reasonably to select attorney capable of presenting effective
defense and who will bill reasonably for services).

138. Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1291 (Alaska 1979). For a more comprehensive analysis of the doctrine of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in Alaska, see Jason R. Erb, Note, The Implied Covenant of Good Faithand Fair
Dealingin Alaska: One Court's License to Override ContractualExpectations, 11
ALASKA L. Ruv. 35 (1994).
139. CHI, 844 P.2d at 1121 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1125 (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
142. Id. at 1121.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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may not be able or have an incentive to influence the defense of
the underlying tort action in favor of the insurer, this article
concludes that not all coverage issues have the potential to affect
the quality of the defense.
A. Even Assuming the Validity of the Court's Premises, the
Resulting Conclusion Does Not Logically Follow.
In analyzing the conflicts of interest that can exist between an
insurer and its insured when a reservation of rights has been issued,
the CHI court found that "appointed counsel may tend to favor the
interests of the insurer" for a variety of reasons, none of which are
professional14 and most of which are related to the generation of
future business. 46 In 1980, the Alaska Supreme Court in Bayless
& Roberts explained, in some detail, the types of conflicts of
interest that can arise between insurer and insured. 47 Although
the court did not evaluate the ability of appointed counsel to
further the interests of the insurer, these enumerated conflicts
ultimately formed the basis for CHPs recognition of the insured's
right to select its own counsel.
1. Appointed Counsel Will Be Unable to Slant His Efforts to
Prejudice the Insured. Even assuming that the CHI decision has
articulated the nature of the conflict between the insurer and the
insured accurately,"8 it fails to explain the manner in which
appointed counsel could "slant his efforts"'4 in favor of the
insured. The court also fails to detail how an attorney could
"covertly frame a defense to achieve a verdict upon a theory under
which no coverage would result so that the insurer could later
assert that the defense was not covered."' 50 Moreover, as suggested by Justice Compton in his dissent, the CHI court never
addresses a logical extension of its reasoning: just as insurerappointed counsel may have tendencies toward bias and preferential treatment in favor of the party that selected them, so may
attorneys chosen by the insured.'

145. The term "professional" here means related to professional responsibility
or conduct and governed by the ethics rules.
146. CHI, 844 P.2d at 1116-17.
147. Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281,289 (Alaska

1980).
148. This article subsequently examines this assumption. See infra part IV.A.2.
149. CHI, 844 P.2d at 1116-17 (citing United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Lewis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 938 n.5 (8th Cir. 1988)).
150. Bayless & Roberts, 608 P.2d at 289.
151. CHI, 844 P.2d at 1130 (Compton, J., dissenting).
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The court fails to examine whether appointed counsel could
act on alleged tendencies towards bias. Certainly a coverage
dispute between an insurer and the insured presents some level of
conflict. Appointed counsel, by virtue of some longstanding
relationship with the insurer, may somehow be inclined to favor
that party's interests. If a defense attorney does not have the
opportunity to further the interests of the insurer, however, the
rationale for allowing the insured to designate independent counsel
is hollow. One pair of commentators, summarizing the California
case law, state that "where the attorney can affect coverage by the
tactical decisions he makes, the attorney has a conflict of interest.
But when the attorney cannot affect the coverage issue, there is no
conflict."' 52
At a minimum, the inquiry should consider how the actions of
defense counsel in defending the underlying tort action could affect
the ultimate resolution of the coverage issue. Alaska decisions
leading up to CHI failed to explore that question in depth. Bayless
& Roberts alluded in dictum to this problem of pro-insurer
manipulation, focusing on how findings made in the underlying tort
action could affect subsequent coverage litigation between the
insurer and the insured. 3 However, the CHI court held that the
rationale underlying this dictum did not apply to policy defense
situations, as a policy defense rarely involves facts germane to
litigation between the insurer and the insured. 4
In coverage defenses, as well, insurer-appointed counsel will
not likely be able to meaningfully slant their efforts in favor of the
insurer. Consider the typical coverage conflict scenario, present in
CHI,55 where both negligent and intentional tort claims are
litigated, but the policy covers only the former. 156 The doctrine
of collateral estoppel bars a party from relitigating an issue that a
court has previously resolved against him. 57 This rule is justified

152. Brown & Romaker, supra note 19, at 67. This limitation is not recognized

in the sweeping rule announced by the court in CHI. In this respect, among
others,
153.
154.
155.
156.

the court appears to have surpassed Cumis.
Bayless & Roberts, 608 P.2d at 289-91.
CHI, 844 P.2d at 1118.
Id. at 1115.
Id. Other types of conflicts present similar issues. See supra part II.B.

(categorizing types of conflicts).
157. Murray v. Feight, 741 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Alaska 1987). In order for the
doctrine to apply, three factors must be present: (1) there must be a final judgment

on the merits for the issue in question; (2) the question in the prior action must
be identical to that presented in the later proceeding; and (3) the person against
whom the estoppel is sought must have been a party, or in privity with a party, in
the prior action. Id.
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on the ground of judicial economy, as it eliminates the need for
multiple trials of the same issues. It is considered equitable to the
estopped party, since he has already had one full opportunity to
litigate the issue.15
The Alaska Supreme Court, however, has declined to •apply
159
the doctrine to disputes between an insurer and an insured.
Although findings made in the underlying tort action generally bind
an insurer, the Alaska Supreme Court has held that the principle
of collateral estoppel does not apply to issues with respect to which
the insurer has a conflict of interest with its insured. 6 ° Thus,
regardless of how the attorney may try to affect the particular
outcome of the underlying action, the result will bar neither the
insurer nor the insured in its subsequent coverage litigation.
Consequently, the CHI decision must rest upon some less
substantial way in which the defense counsel appointed by an
insurer could conceivably "slant his efforts." The CHI court's
concern that insurance counsel would "covertly frame the defense"
is not well founded.'
2. BecauseAll CoverageIssues Do Not Factorinto the Quality
of the Defense, the CHI Rule Confers an Overbroad Right to
Independent Counsel. Although straightforward, the approach of
the CHI court ignores the fact that not all coverage issues have a
potential to affect the quality of the defense. As observed by
Justice Moore, because not all coverage issues will even potentially
affect the incentives of insurer-appointed counsel, "it is far from
clear that the scope of the conflict of interest problem in the
defense context is so broad or the frequency of harm to the insured
such a drastic curtailment of the insurer's
so great as to warrant
162
contract rights.'
The CHI decision fails to examine critically whether it is
realistic to assume that an insurer will strive to protect its coverage
interests at the expense of the insured. 63 In many cases, the

158. Id. at 1154
159. See CHI, 844 P.2d at 1119 n.12. "The view that issues determined in the
initial action as to which a conflict of interest exists between insurer and insured
may be subsequently relitigated appears to be sensible and in accordance with a
number of authorities." Id. at 1119 (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 1113; Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281,
290 (Alaska 1980) (dictum) (citing Ferguson v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 460 P.2d
342, 348-49 (Or. 1969)).
161. See CHI, 844 P.2d at 1118.
162. Id. at 1126 (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
163. This issue differs from the earlier question of the appointed counsel and
his allegiances, but ultimately, it focuses on the same issue: whether the appointed
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coverage issue develops as a result of the plaintiff's allegations in
the complaint."
Those allegations, however, may in fact bear
little relationship to reality, as a complaint may contain several
alternative claims, some likely to be outside the scope of coverage. 6 Tactical concerns may underlie a plaintiff's decision to
make multiple claims, as the creation of a coverage issue may
create damaging tensions in the relationship between the insurer
and insured. 66 If the insured has reason to doubt his coverage,
for example, he may agree to a settlement that is unwarranted or
excessive in an effort to ensure that the suit is settled on terms that
place him within the coverage of his policy. 67 In such a situation,
the insured unwittingly aligns himself with the claimant, who is the
true adversary of both the insured and the insurer.'
The coverage issue does not arise until the insurer informs the
insured of either a reservation or denial of rights. Under wellestablished Alaska law, however, the doctrine of good faith
compels the insurer to inform the insured of all apparent coverage
problems.'69 The insurer must promptly "'give the insured such
notice of its intention to deny liability and of its refusal to defend
as will give the insured a reasonable time to protect himself"'"7"
and "provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insurance
policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a
claim.' 171 Thus, "although the insurer is obligated to inform the
insured of a coverage issue, pursuing the issue may not be in the
interest of the insurer."' 72 The CHI court incorrectly makes the
broad presumption that the insurer will sacrifice the insured's interests in the tort case to advance its own interests in the coverage
case. This presumption ignores the fact that if the tort claimant
loses, the dispute over coverage becomes irrelevant.
CHI's broad rule also fails to consider that some bases for a
reservation of rights do not pose a potential for conflicts of interest.
Unlike the common conflicts of interest that occur in a coverage
dispute over whether conduct was negligent or intentional, "a claim

counsel will ethically represent an insured.

164. Mallen, supra note 41, at 108.
165. Id. (citing Parker v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 440 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1981)).

166. Id.
167. Id.

168. Id.
169. Sauer v. Home Indem. Co., 841 P.2d 176, 182 (Alaska 1992).
170. Id. (quoting 7C JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE
§ 4686 (rev. vol. 1979)).

171. Id.
172. Mallen, supra note 41, at 109 (discussing risks for the insurer in that
situation).
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for punitive damages differs from that [situation] in that no alternative, whether of fact or theory, is presented for the defense counsel."173 Regardless of whether the policy covers a claim for
punitive damages, "the ethical obligation of defense counsel[,
appointed or independent,] is simply to resist the claim."' 74 It is
difficult under the rationale of the CHI opinion to perceive the
conflict of interest for defense counsel in this situation, since no
alternative course of action is presented.
Despite a demonstrated concern about the disclosure of
confidences by a lawyer hired to conduct the insured's defense, the
CHI court also fails to consider that such disclosure can actually
prejudice the insurer's interests. Such disclosure could potentially
lead to an estoppel ruling on the insurer's coverage defense.'
Disclosure of confidences also directly contravenes Alaska Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.6.176
Parsons v. Continental National American Group,177 an
Arizona case, illustrates how behavior designed to benefit the
insurer can backfire. 17 In Parsons,defense counsel informed the
insurer of both the content of the insured's confidential psychiatric
file, as well as confidential disclosures by the insured that concered the willful nature of his acts.179 In a later proceeding, the
insurer was estopped from asserting a willful acts exclusion because
it obtained the relevant information from an attorney who had
violated his duty of confidentiality."
Unethical behavior can be disastrous not only for the attorney
but also for the insurer.181 A well-known commentator has
catalogued the potential for disaster:
Such [unethical] assistance can result in a waiver or estoppel of
the insurer's otherwise valid policy or coverage defenses. If the
insurer ratifies this conduct, the attorney's "favored client" may
also be subjected to punitive damages. The attorney may lose

173. Id. at 116.
174. Id. at 112.
175. Ronald E. Mallen, Insurance Counsel: The Fine Line Between Professional
Responsibility and Malpractice,45 INS. CouNs. J. 244, 247 (1978).
176. ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.6 (1993). Rule 1.6
provides that a lawyer shall not disclose information relating to representation
unless the client consents to disclosure after consultation, but the lawyer may
disclose such information to prevent the client from committing certain criminal
acts or to establish a defense in a controversy between the lawyer and the client.
Id.
177. 550 P.2d 94 (Ariz. 1976).
178. Mallen, supra note 175, at 247.

179. Id.
180. Id.

181. Id.
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an important client, and face disciplinary charges, and malprac-

tice claims from the insured and even from the client he favored,
the insurer 1 2
Nevertheless, in support of the CHI rationale, Professors Berch
and Berch argue that an insured should be allowed to select
independent counsel even when the complaint against the insured
merely alleges non-covered punitive damages.1" These commentators suggest that the appointed attorney would "shape the case to
prejudice the insured and relieve the insurer from the obligation to
indemnify."'" In so doing, they suggest that a lawyer would so
completely ignore his professional responsibility as to "show the
jury that the insured acted so wantonly as to justify an award of
punitive damages"'" and thus "relieve the insurer from liability
to indemnify." '8 6 The authors further contend that a defense
lawyer might engage in some trial strategy to "highlight" intentional conduct to benefit the insurer."8 These arguments are flawed,
however, in that they effectively assume that a lawyer will blatantly
ignore his ethical duties to his client, the insured. The CHI court's
reliance on a similar set of sweeping assumptions about the legal
profession provides a basis for challenging that decision.
B. The Premises Underlying the CHI Holding Are Not Valid
With Regard to the Ethical Character of Attorneys
1. Appointed Counsel Can Ethically Represent an Insured. The CHI court posits that any participation by the insurer
in the appointment of independent counsel automatically taints the
outcome. Taken to its logical extension, the rationale of the court,
in recognizing the right to retain independent counsel, suggests that
an appointed attorney would neglect his professional responsibility
to the insured by favoring the interests of the insurer. Given the
magnitude of such an ethical breach, however, the validity of this
premise is questionable.
Courts in other jurisdictions have rejected the notion that
appointed attorneys will not fulfill their ethical obligations."
The decision of the Indiana Supreme Court in Siebert Oxidermo,

182. Id. at 252-53.
183. Berch & Berch, supra note 107, at 38, cited with approval in CHI of
Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1118 n.9 (Alaska
1993).
184. Berch & Berch, supra note 107, at 38.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Mallen, supra note 41, at 109.
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Inc. v. Shields89 illustrates such an opposing view. That court
stated:
We consider the argument impertinent, if not scandalous.
Without considering the respected reputation of the attorney
involved, we point out that on a daily basis defense attorneys
employed by insurance carriers on behalf of policyholders are
called upon to deal with matters in litigation where the interests
of the policyholder and the carrier do not fully coincide. Under
such circumstances the attorney's duty is, of course, to the
insured whom he has been employed to represent. In response
the defense bar has exhibited no inability to fully comply with
both the letter and spirit of Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. If it were otherwise we suspect the desirability
of requiring carriers to supply defense counsel would have long
since disappeared as a term of the policy."9
The authorities relied upon by the CHI court, however, are
less optimistic. An examination of those articles calls into question
their utility as a foundation for the recognition of the insured's
right to independent counsel. A close reading of the Berchs'
article, 9' for example, reveals a cynical attitude towards the
ethics of lawyers. Without citing any authority, the authors state:
At all times, the attorney must remain completely loyal to the
insured. If the insured elects to use the attorney that the insurer
selected, then that attorney should not do anything to prejudice
the insured's rights, unless required to do so by the Rules of
Professional Responsibility. The difficulty, well-nigh impossibility, of adhering to the precepts in the rea! world should caution
counsel who are selected and retained by, but who are not truly
independent of, the insurer against ever representing insureds.' 92
The CHI court could not have ignored this cynicism 93 in developing its resolution of the case.
A comparison of this observation about the "real world" with
the Indiana court's view in Siebert Oxidermo supports Justice
Moore's position in his separate opinion in CHI. Justice Moore
stated:
[T]he rule adopted by the court today presupposes that no
counsel selected or approved of by an insurer can represent an
insured without consciously or unconsciously compromising the
insured's interests in favor of those of the insurer. My confidence in the integrity of the members of the Alaska Bar will not
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

430 N.E.2d 401 (Ind.Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 446 N.E.2d 332 (Ind.1983).
Id. at 403.
Berch & Berch, supra note 107, at 27.
Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
The commentators appear "cynical" through their suggestion of the

"difficulty, well-nigh impossibility" of following ethical standards. Lawyers are

obliged to follow these standards by oath, training and law.
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allow me to support the adoption of a rule of law based on such
an assumption. 94
In a similar vein, Justice Compton, in dissent, forcefully
questioned why the court failed to apply the same standard to
independent counsel selected by the insured, observing:
If counsel selected by the insured "slants" efforts in favor of the
insured, is this a less disturbing result? If ongoing contractual
relationships, strong financial ties, and sincere friendships
between the insured and independent counsel influence counsel's
conduct, is this a less disturbing result? Worse, if an insured
does not happen to be a significant factor in independent
counsel's financial well-being, counsel selected by the insured
may (consciously or subconsciously) curry favor with the insurer
in order to establish an ongoing contractual, financially rewarding relationship with the insurer. Is this a less disturbing result?
The dollar still comes out of the same pocket. Once the [Rules
of ProfessionalConductare] discardedas setting ethical guidelines
for the profession, no attorney/client relationship is safe from
manipulation.95
The Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct provide the framework for the insurer to retain the right, as well as the duty, to

defend its insured. The Rules can provide the mechanism for
checking any abuses by the insurer-selected attorneys. Regardless
of coverage status, representation of the insured by appointed
counsel requires the consent of the insured under the Rules of

Professional Conduct.196 The implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing between the insurer and its insured prevents the

insured from unreasonably withholding that consent. The reasonableness of withholding consent would depend on both the

relationship between the proposed counsel and the insurer-which
presumably must be disclosed-and, most importantly, the
particular coverage issue in the underlying case. This approach
realistically asks less of the implied covenant than the CHI court's

approach.
As observed by one set of commentators in connection with
the Cumis decision, attorneys could potentially abuse the position
of "Cumis counsel."'"
Counsel selected by the insured has little
incentive to minimize defense costs, as the insurer pays the bill for

194. CHI of Alaska Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1129
(Alaska 1993) (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also id. at
1130 (Compton, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority's opinion as "the
court's view of the willingness of counsel to follow the dollar and not the Code of
Professional Responsibility").
195. Id. at 1130 (Compton, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
196. ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.8(f) (1993); see also
id. Rule 1.7 cmt. ("Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service").
197. Brown & Romaker, supra note 19, at 64.
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these legal services. 9 ' The only reviewing authority is the insur-

ance company, and although the insurer is required to pay only the

"reasonable costs" of the independent counsel services, 99 the line
between an excessively costly defense and aggressive advocacy is

not easily established. 2 ° The "measure of protection" purportedly provided by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
2 ' has been criticized as
against overbilling and overlitigating
2 2
0
"inadequate and unworkable.'
The blanket rule enunciated in CHI will prove over-inclusive
and will fail to remedy the problem it attempts to address. The
ethical rules, however, and the fiduciary obligations established by
case law provide adequate safeguards, direction and guidance to

resolve potential conflict of interest situations.2 3 Favoring the
coverage interests of the insurer, whether deliberately or subcon-

sciously, constitutes a breach of ethical duty and fiduciary obligation exposing the attorney to discipline and malpractice liability. 4 Because existing rules of law adequately protect the
insured's interests, as Justice Moore observed, "the broad prophy-

lactic rule adopted by the court seems superfluous."2

5

2. Recognizing That Appointed Counsel Has One Client, the
Insured, Providesthe StartingPointto Rethinking CHI. The "dual-

198. Id.
199. CHI, 844 P.2d at 1121.
200. Brown & Romaker, supra note 19, at 64; see also Doe v. Hughes,
Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin, 838 P.2d 804 (Alaska 1992) (holding that
avoidance of unnecessary fees and costs is part of every attorney's ethical
responsibility to client, but attorney is not free to neglect measure that will protect
client from clearly foreseeable risk of harm merely because there will be some
additional cost to client if measure is taken).
201. CHI, 844 P.2d at 1121.
202. Id. at 1126 (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
203. As compared to the Alaska Supreme Court's doubt of the integrity of
attorneys, the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct place full faith in the integrity
of attorneys, serving only to guide their ethical decisions: "Within the framework
of these Rules many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such
issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral
judgment, guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules." ALASKA RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities (1993).
Moreover, this confidence in the ethical character of the attorney is essential to
sustain the self-regulating nature of the legal profession: "To the extent that
lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for
government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal
profession's independence from government domination." Id.
204. CHI, 844 P.2d at 1128 (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
205. Id. (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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client" doctrine rests upon the assumption that appointed counsel
has two clients in any given case: the insurer and the insured. 6
The acceptance of the "dual-client" doctrine by the authorities
relied upon by the CHI court constitutes the chief shortcoming of
the opinion. Although the dual-client doctrine appears to be the
view adopted in the majority of jurisdictions, other courts and
commentators have recognized that the insured is deemed to be the
defense counsel's sole client. 2
The dual-client doctrine is flawed on both ethical and public
policy grounds.2" Both the Code of Professional Responsibility,
in force at the time of the CHI opinion, and the recently adopted
Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct assume that insurance
defense counsel can and will act ethically. Subsequent to the CHI
decision, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted Rule 1.8(f), which
provides:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client
from one other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) information relating to the representation of a client is
protected as required by Rule 1.6.
Furthermore, the comment to Rule 1.7 states:
A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the
client is informed of that factor and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the
client. See Rule 1.8(f). For example, when an insurer and its
insured have conflicting interest in a matter arising from a
liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to

206. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar Co. v. Lewis A. Roser Co., 585

F.2d 932, 938 11.5 (8th Cir. 1978) ("the real client-the one who is paying his fee
and from whom he hopes to receive future business-the insurance company");

San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("dual representation by counsel").

207. See, e.g., Robert E. O'Malley, Ethics Principalsfor the Insurer,the Insured
and Defense Counsel: The Eternal TriangleReformed, 66 TUL. L. REV. 511, 512

(1991).
208. Most courts and scholars appear to have accepted the dual-client doctrine.
However, at least four scholars have challenged the validity of the doctrine and its
corollary that defense counsel cannot be trusted to provide loyal and competent

representation to the insured. Mallen, supra note 41, at 108; John K. Morris,
Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under Liability Insurance Policies:A Proposed

Solution, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 457; O'Malley, supra note 207; Debra A. Winarski,
Walking the Fine Line: A Defense Counsel'sPerspective,28 TORT & INS. L. J. 596,
597 (1993).

209. ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCt Rule 1.8(f) (1993).
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provide special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should

assure the special counsel's professional independence.21
The proposal suggested in this article could assure the insured
of the independence of counsel. The solution advocated by Justice
Moore in his separate opinion would do so as well. Although the
insurer's right to control the litigation must yield to the insured's
right to independent representation when a conflict arises, this
should not mean that the insurer's right to participate in the
defense is completely extinguished. The CHI holding, however,
accomplishes just that.
Ironically, with the promulgation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct in July 1993, the Alaska Supreme Court implicitly
recognizes that attorneys can distinguish between their client and
the person who pays the bill, exactly what the CHI court found that
attorneys could not do.2 '
V. A PROPOSAL

The recognition of an attorney's ability to protect the client
first and foremost in the Rules of Professional Conduct, together
with the weakness of the logical premises that underlie the CHI
opinion, support the argument that the Alaska Supreme Court
should revisit the CHI holding and restrict its application 12
One simple approach would be to construe more narrowly the
phrase "right to independent counsel." As Justice Moore points
out, "courts and commentators recognize that cases permitting an
insured to select independent counsel have not defined what is
meant by [the right to select independent counsel]."'
At the
210. Id. Rule 1.7 cmt. ("Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service").
211. In contrast to the distrust shown to insurer-appointed counsel by the CHI
majority, the United States Supreme Court has stated that in the context of
representation of criminal codefendants by a single attorney, even when capital
punishment is at stake, "we generally presume that the lawyer is fully conscious
of the overarching duty of complete loyalty to his or her client. Trial courts
appropriately and 'necessarily rely in large measure upon the good faith and good
judgment of defense counsel."' Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784, reh'g denied,
483 U.S. 1056 (1987) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980)); see
also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978) ("Requiring or permitting a
single attorney to represent codefendants, often referred to as joint representation,
is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of
counsel.").
212. It is worth noting that Justice Burke, one of the three justices who made
up the CHI majority, has since retired.
213. CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1124
(Alaska 1993) (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Federal Ins.
Co. v. X-Rite, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1223, 1228 n.1 (W.D. Mich. 1990); ALLEN D.
WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES-REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE
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same time:
[C]ourts have also recognized "a right in the insurer to determine whether to provide independent counsel of its choosing or
to reimburse the insured for counsel of its choice." .. . [M]any

cases recognize the insurer's right to select replacement "independent counsel," or at a minimum, to participate in the defense
of the insured alongside counsel selected by the insured....P
The Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted since the
CHI opinion, require that any insurer-appointed lawyer defending
an insured must first obtain the consent of that client. Thus, a
framework is already in place that provides a starting point for a
more reasonable method of ensuring that the insured receives
independent counsel. Regardless of the existence of any reservation of rights, all appointed counsel must obtain the consent of the
insured to the proposed representation.215 If the appointed
counsel has represented the insurer in the past, the lawyer must
consider whether that fact requires disclosure or necessitates a
waiver by the insured2 6 It is equally clear that if the insured
unreasonably withholds consent where no coverage issue exists and
for no other legitimate reason, then that action would constitute a
violation of the cooperation clause of the typical insurance policy,
as well as of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Thus, the requirement that the insurer should have an opportunity
to propose such counsel does not entail any additional burdens
upon any of the parties to the tripartite relationship.
Creative approaches to the situation might include other steps.
217
First, the insurer• could give the insured recommendations regarding
several attorneys rather than an assignment of one.
The
insurer could therefore be certain that whichever attorney is chosen
will be competent in the field of insurance defense litigation.218
The insurer could also prepare biographies of the lawyers on
the list of proposed counsel and provide them to the insured.219
One commentator has urged the following approach: "The
company should develop and utilize guidelines for defense counsel

§ 4.20, at 179 (2d ed. 1988)).
214. Id (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Federal Ins.
Co. v. X-Rite, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1223, 1228 (W.D. Mich. 1990)). Justice Moore
opted for a scheme where the insurer would have the right to approve counsel
selected by the insured.
215. ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuct Rule 1.8(0 (1993).
216. See, e.g., id. Rules 1.7-1.9.
217. Mallen, supra note 41, at 123.
218. Id.
219. Id.
COMPANIES AND INSUREDS
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which set forth and implement the philosophy that
counsel's
'
principal activities are for the benefit of the insured." MO
All three options-the CHI majority rule, the proposal of
Justice Moore and the proposal put forth in this article-rely at
least in part on the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing." They differ, however, in emphasizing the extent of the
protection afforded by the implied covenant and on what conduct
triggers a breach. The majority's rule gives the insured the power
to choose.'
If the insurer is dissatisfied, it must prove that the
lawyer selected lacks reasonable competencel Under the plan
proposed by Justice Moore, the insurer carries the veto powe
To thwart the exercise of that discretion, there must be an unreasonable refusal by the insurer to agree to the lawyer so selected.'2 Finally, the Rules of Professional Conduct give the insured
the last word on consent to appointed counsel. 6 The insurer,
however, can vindicate its contractual right to defend by proving
that the insured unreasonably refused to consent.
Both Justice Moore's proposal and the proposal submitted
herein ask less of the implied covenant than the position adopted
by the majority in CHL California case law recognized such an
implied covenant.2 7 So many people abused the Cumis rule,
however, that California passed legislation to address the problem.m
Given a lawyer's ethical obligations, together with guidelines
and reporting requirements, the insured could be confident that the
lawyer would act solely as counsel for it and not as counsel to the
insurer.

220. Id. Another commentator also provides a detailed proposal of this sort.
O'Malley, supra note 207, at 520-25.
221. See Erb, supra note 138.
222. CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1121

(Alaska 1993).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1122 (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
225. Id. (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
226. See ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8. (1993).
227. Center Found. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 278 Cal. Rptr. 13, 21 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991).
228.
See CHI, 844 P.2d at 1126 n.10 (Moore, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). Moore notes that the majority opinion "is likely to have similar effects
in Alaska and will probably require legislative intervention to ultimately bring
fairness and order to this complex area of law." Id. (Moore, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
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CONCLUSION

The Alaska Supreme Court in CHI has gone as far as any
court in the nation in recognizing an insured's right to independent
counsel. Whenever an insurer reserves its right to dispute
coverage, the court has bestowed upon the insured the ability to
select counsel unilaterally. This right is subject to only the
requirement that the lawyer so selected be reasonably competent
to handle the matter. Thus, the court has extinguished the
contractually negotiated right of the insurer to defend its insured
or, at least, to retain some involvement in that defense whenever
the insurer reserves its right to contest coverage.
This sweeping rule is flawed for a variety of reasons. It
proceeds from a cynicism about defense counsel's ethics, unwarranted by reason or experience. It fails to recognize the many
inappropriate situations in which this rule will be invoked. It
ignores the Rules of Professional Conduct that govern the legal
profession in Alaska.

The Alaska Supreme Court's promulgation of the Alaska
Rules of Professional Conduct, subsequent to the decision in CHI,
provides the insured with an adequate remedy for the potential
abuses by lawyers and insurers of the insured's interests. Under
Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(f)(1), in every instance in
which an insurer appoints counsel, the insured must consent to that

representation after consultation. 9 This mechanism can provide
the means by which the insurer would appoint independent counsel
to represent the insured, subject to the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. This approach is closely related to that
proposed by Justice Moore in his separate opinion, although he
would reserve the right of the insured to choose. Either approach
is preferable to the blanket rule announced in CHI.
The proposal made in this article seeks to strike a more
favorable balance between the interests of the insurer and the
insured. Otherwise, given the liberal nature of the pleading rules
in Alaska, the CHI holding could all but consume not just a right
of the insurer to defend its insured, but also any right of the insurer
to participate in the formulation of that defense.

229. ALASKA RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.8(f)(1) (1993).

